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Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze
data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely com-
pletely on the users’ willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively
incentivize users’ active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive
mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent smartphones are equipped with a plethora of embedded multi-modal sensors,
and integrate wireless communication technologies as well as complex processing ca-
pabilities. These technological features, coupled with the widespread usage of smart-
phones [Cisco 2014], have contributed to the emergence of applications based on a new
and promising paradigm known as participatory sensing1. The main idea behind par-
ticipatory sensing is to enable ordinary citizens (or users) to actively monitor various
phenomena pertaining to themselves (e.g., health, social connections) or their com-
munity (e.g., environment). For example, the cameras on smartphones can be used
1For the sake of generality, in this paper we use the term participatory sensing to designate applications
where participants voluntarily contribute sensor data for their own benefit and/or the benefit of the commu-
nity by using their phones. Such a notion therefore includes mobiscopes [Abdelzaher et al. 2007], opportunis-
tic sensing [Campbell et al. 2006], and equivalent terms such as mobile phone sensing, smartphone sensing
[Lane et al. 2010], or crowdsensing. It also covers specific terminologies focusing on particular monitoring
subjects, such as urban sensing [Campbell et al. 2006], citizen sensing [Burke et al. 2006], people-centric
sensing [Campbell et al. 2006], [Campbell et al. 2008], and community sensing [Krause et al. 2008].
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as video and image sensors [Bao and Roy Choudhury 2010], the microphone can be
used as an acoustic sensor [D’Hondt et al. 2013], and the embedded global position-
ing system (GPS) receiver can be used to gather accurate location information, while
gyroscopes, accelerometers, and proximity sensors can be used to extract contextual
information about the user (e.g., if the user is driving [Nawaz and Mascolo 2014]).
Further, additional sensors can be easily interfaced with the phone via Bluetooth or
wired connections (e.g., temperature sensors [Thermodo 2014]). Real-life applications,
which can take advantage of both low-level sensor data and high-level user activities,
range from real-time traffic monitoring applications like Nericell [Mohan et al. 2008]
or Waze [Waze 2014] to air pollution monitoring [Me´ndez et al. 2011] and social net-
working [Miluzzo et al. 2007]. For an excellent survey of applications based on the
participatory sensing paradigm, please refer to [Khan et al. 2013].
Although a clear consensus on the best architecture for participatory sensing sys-
tems has not been reached yet, the majority of the existing participatory sensing ap-
plications utilize a centralized cloud-based architecture. In particular, volunteers use
mobile phones to collect sensor data and submit via wireless data communication links
to a participatory sensing platform (PSP) located in the cloud. The sensing tasks on
the phones can be triggered manually, automatically, or based on the current context
[Christin et al. 2011]. On the PSP, the data is analyzed and made available in various
forms, for example, graphical representations or maps showing the sensing results at
an individual or community scale. The results may be displayed locally on the users’
mobile phones or accessed by the broader public through web-portals, depending on
the application needs.
Participatory sensing provides a significant number of advantages with respect to
previous sensing paradigms:
— The lack of a fixed sensing infrastructure dramatically eases deployment and main-
tenance costs associated with the administration of the participatory sensing system;
— The sheer number of smartphone users, coupled with the ubiquitousness of WiFi and
3/4G cellular-based Internet connectivity, allows a level of spatio-temporal sensing
coverage impossible to achieve in previous paradigms, including wireless sensor net-
works;
— The presence of people in the sensing loop provides the opportunity to acquire opin-
ions along with sensor data, allowing the emergence of complex mobile applications
such as real-time traffic monitoring [Thiagarajan et al. 2009], [Waze 2014], [Zhou
et al. 2014];
— The widespread availability of software development tools and markets for smart-
phone applications (apps) makes development and distribution of participatory sens-
ing software relatively easy.
The most distinctive characteristic of participatory sensing is that it relies com-
pletely on the voluntary commitment of participants to submit up-to-date and reliable
information to the PSP. This implies that a key factor for the success of participatory
sensing applications is incentivizing users’ active participation in the sensing surveys.
To this end, a number of incentive mechanisms, mostly based on game theory [Tadelis
2013] and auction theory [Krishna 2009], have been proposed to increase not only the
collected amount of data, but also its quality. The underlying idea of such incentive
mechanisms is to reward users depending on their contribution to the participatory
sensing campaign. For example, rewards made may be based on submitting a report
close to a desirable location [Jaimes et al. 2012], how a report contributes to the social
welfare [Luo and Tham 2012; Tham and Luo 2014], the number of reports that a user
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sent, or the time dedicated to collecting and submitting sensing reports [Yang et al.
2012].
A number of research issues regarding incentivizing users in participatory sensing
systems, however, still remain. For example, it is unclear what is the best way to in-
centivize users in participatory sensing. In particular, while some people may respond
to a monetary reward to participate, others may still be willing to participate for free,
provided they receive sufficient value by gaining access to the crowdsensed data that
is shared via the participatory sensing system. Thus, understanding the reasons that
drive individuals to participate in participatory sensing campaigns could lead to de-
signing more effective incentive mechanisms. Another challenge to overcome is the fact
that participatory sensing apps may access particularly sensitive information, such as
the visited locations of the users, as well as personal multimedia data such as photos
and video. This may significantly discourage participation to the sensing campaigns,
regardless of the amount of incentive put forth [Albers et al. 2013], [Krontiris et al.
2010]. Furthermore, most of the existing incentive mechanisms reward users irrespec-
tive of the quality of the information contained in the reports, which may undermine
information reliability and encourage abuse of the system by malicious participants
[Restuccia and Das 2014]. Therefore, designing mechanisms able to estimate and en-
force information quality becomes of primary importance. However, enforcing quality
of information in participatory sensing is extremely challenging, due to the possible
presence of unreliable humans in the sensing loop. These and other research chal-
lenges still need to be analyzed and discussed—and this motivates our work.
Within the scope of this manuscript, we analyze the state-of-the-art in incentive
mechanisms as applied to participatory sensing campaigns; besides describing the so-
lutions currently applied, we also highlight their limitations, and discuss open issues
as well as their impact on participation of users in sensing surveys. Specifically, our
contributions can be summarized as follows:
— We propose a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing
systems.
— For each component of the taxonomy, we discuss and analyze existing incentive mech-
anisms.
— Based on this analysis, we identify and discuss an agenda of open research challenges
that must be addressed to support widespread participation of users in sensing cam-
paigns.
These contributions are presented as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the concept
of participatory sensing. In Section 3, we introduce a taxonomy of existing incentiviza-
tion mechanisms for participatory sensing. Sections 4, 5 and 6 presents an overview
and an analysis of existing incentives as they relate to the organizational structure of
the taxonomy. In Section 7, we discuss open research challenges, before concluding the
paper in Section 8 with directions of future work.
2. WHAT IS PARTICIPATORY SENSING?
Participatory sensing [Burke et al. 2006] is a novel paradigm that leverages the
widespread usage of smartphones to acquire up-to-date and fine-grained information
about a location (or event) of interest. As depicted in Figure 1, most of the existing
participatory sensing systems are generally organized into an architecture where the
main components are the users, the sensing application (app), and the participatory
sensing platform (PSP).
— The main component of the system is the users, whose task is to use their smart-
phones (and in particular, the sensing application) to capture different kinds of sensor
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Users Sensing application
PSP
Fig. 1. Participatory sensing architecture.
data, such as location, images, sound samples, accelerometer data, biometric data,
and barometric pressure. However, opinions about the sensing area or an environ-
mental phenomenon, for example, traffic status or weather information, may also be
provided by the users. In practical implementations of participatory sensing systems,
users typically register with the system by providing using a username and password
[Waze 2014] that allows their contributions to be uniquely identified.
— The sensing application (app), deployed on the users’ smartphones, is distributed
through common application markets like Google Play or App Store, or is retrieved
from a mobile cloud computing system [Fakoor et al. 2012]. It is responsible for pro-
viding the users with a friendly user interface for data acquisition and visualization.
In particular, data acquisition may be triggered by the users themselves or may be
elicited by the app, on a one-time on-demand basis or periodically.
— The backend component of the system is the participatory sensing platform (PSP),
responsible for the filtering, elaboration, and redistribution of sensed data, as well
as coordinating every operation performed by the system. This component is usually
implemented by a set of servers dedicated to the processing of sensed data [Restuccia
and Das 2014]. The PSP also ensures efficient storage and elaboration of the sensed
data coming from the users, which may be stored in relational databases [Gaonkar
et al. 2008], or databases specially adapted to the management of sensor readings,
for example, sensedDB [Grosky et al. 2007]. Along with the main elaboration system,
the PSP might leverage a reputation system and an incentive mechanism. Briefly,
the target of a reputation system is to predict the reliability of the data sent by
the users based on their past behavior [Wang et al. 2013; Huang et al. 2010] so as
to filter out unreliable reports. Conversely, the target of an incentive mechanism is
to encourage participation of users by appropriately rewarding the users for their
contributions to the participatory sensing campaign. The detailed discussion of such
incentive mechanisms is the focus of this paper.
3. OVERVIEW OF INCENTIVE MECHANISMS IN PARTICIPATORY SENSING
In this section, we first identify the main components of the sensing and incentiviza-
tion process of existing systems. We then propose a taxonomy of incentive mechanisms
for participatory sensing, which will be used to organize a detailed discussion of the
state of the art in the following sections.
Figure 2 depicts the main activities of the sensing and incentivization processes in a
participatory sensing system. Since this collection of activities is performed again and
again over the lifetime of the participatory sensing campaign, henceforth, we will use
the term sensing round to refer to the execution of the following four steps.
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Users PSP
Sensing task advertisement
Private information disclosure
Sensing task & reward assignment
User selection,
task scheduling &
reward calculation
Execution of
sensing task
Data transmission
Fig. 2. Sensing and incentivization activities within a sensing round.
(1) Sensing task advertisement. In this phase, the participatory sensing platform (PSP)
communicates to the users the list of sensing tasks that need to be executed dur-
ing the current sensing round. In particular, each sensing task specifies a series
of requirements, such as the sampling rate requested [Koutsopoulos 2013], mini-
mum sensing time [Ji and Chen 2014], maximum distance from specified location
[Ueyama et al. 2014], or task expiration time [Li and Cao 2013; Zhao et al. 2014].
For example, a sensing task might be “report the current traffic status near the
Golden Gate bridge by 5:00PM”. Additional parameters may be sent, such as qual-
ity of information requirements [Albers et al. 2013; Liu et al. 2011]. Sensing tasks
can be advertised statically [Yang et al. 2012; Feng et al. 2014a; Duan et al. 2014]
or dynamically [Restuccia and Das 2014; Feng et al. 2014b]. In some cases, de-
pending on the application, tasks can be retrieved by the users asynchronously,
e.g., each day [Li and Cao 2014], or whenever requested by the participants [Li
and Cao 2013].
(2) Private information disclousure. After the advertisement of the sensing tasks, the
PSP collects information about the participating user, often called the type [Yang
et al. 2012] of the user, which can be leveraged by the PSP to make a choice re-
garding the scheduling of sensing tasks. For example, users may supply a bidding
value, which is included in the user type for use in auction-based incentive mech-
anisms. The PSP may collect temporal information about the user, which can be
used to determine the user’s availability to perform sensing services [Han et al.
2013]. The PSP may also acquire information regarding the characterization of the
skills of a person [Luo et al. 2014c; Luo et al. 2014b] and the incurred cost for
the required sensing services, for example, privacy loss [Duan et al. 2012], energy
consumption, or mobile data charges [Luo and Tham 2012].
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(3) User selection, task scheduling, reward calculation and assignment. After receiving
private information describing the users, the PSP selects a subset of users that
will submit the sensed information to the PSP, and schedules the sensing tasks for
users. For example, users might be selected according to their geographical position
[Ma et al. 2014; Feng et al. 2014a; Zhang et al. 2014], or according to the submitted
bid [Yang et al. 2012], cost of sensing services [Duan et al. 2014], or sensing effort
[Luo et al. 2014b]. Furthermore, the PSP may schedule the sensing tasks according
to the temporal availability of the users [Chen and Wang 2013], [Feng et al. 2014b].
In this phase, the users are also rewarded for their services, usually according to
the time dedicated to the sensing services. The information quality contained in
sensing reports might also be a parameter to decide the amount of reward to assign
to users [Restuccia and Das 2014]. User selection, task scheduling, and reward
assignment algorithms are an important part of incentive mechanisms, and are a
focus of our analysis of the state of the art in Sections 4, 5, and 6.
(4) Execution of sensing task and data transmission. After being selected and in-
structed on the sensing task to execute, a user is allowed to begin performing the
sensing service using the sensing application. The sensing application may be de-
signed to assist in collecting data according to one of the following sensing modes:
manual, automatic, or context-aware [Christin et al. 2011]. In the manual mode,
the participants explicitly trigger the collection of sensor readings when they de-
tect what they perceive to be relevant events, such as traffic congestion. On the
contrary, the participants are not directly involved in the automatic mode (also
known as opportunistic sensing [Khan et al. 2013]), where a sensing application
continuously runs in the background and regularly sends the sensed information
to the PSP, as for example in Nericell [Mohan et al. 2008]). Data collection might
also be triggered by leveraging the context, occurring upon the detection of an event
or condition (e.g., clapping of hands, as in [Bao and Roy Choudhury 2010]). The
sensing application handles the transfer of the sensed data from the smartphone
to the PSP, making use of communication infrastructure available to the mobile
phone, such as WiFi or 3G/4G connectivity. For example, the sensor readings can
be transmitted to the server using SMS or TCP connections [Gaonkar et al. 2008],
remote procedure calls [Miluzzo et al. 2007], or web interfaces [Fakoor et al. 2012].
Recently, opportunitistic forwarding coupled with data fusion has been proposed
as a viable method for data transmission [Ma et al. 2014].
3.1. Taxonomy of incentive mechanisms
Figure 3 illustrates the proposed taxonomy of the approaches used for incentivizing
users in participatory sensing. The taxonomy first differentiates existing work based
on the purpose of the mechanisms; specifically, the first distinction is made between
application-specific and general-purpose incentive mechanisms. This distinction is nec-
essary since the former are ad-hoc mechanisms proposed as a part of the participatory
sensing system, and are tailored to incentivize users’ participation to the specific ap-
plication only; in other words, they are not designed in a way that is generalizable
for broader application. On the other hand, the latter are mechanisms which do not
assume any particular participatory sensing application, but instead are general in
purpose and can be applied to a wide spectrum of systems satisfying the assumptions
of the mechanism. As yet, the majority of the mechanisms proposed have been in the
general-purpose category.
Among the general-purpose mechanisms, another distinction is made based on the
methodology being used to incentive participation. In particular, we differentiate be-
tween game-theoretical approaches, which are grounded in mathematical models that
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Fig. 3. Taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms.
provide a foundation for reasoning about rational decision-making, and mechanisms
that exploit different concepts, such as micropayments [Reddy et al. 2010b]. Game-
theoretical approaches can be further categorized, distinguishing between mecha-
nisms that exploit auction theory [Krishna 2009] and mechanisms that instead use
other game-theoretical concepts such as Stackelberg games [Tadelis 2013].
In the following sections, we extensively discuss the most significant systems pro-
posed so far in each category of the taxonomy. For each category, we will characterize
the foundations of the class of participatory sensing incentive systems, review the state
of the art to highlight key differentiating ideas, and analyze approaches, discussing ad-
vantages and limitations of key elements of individual approaches and, more broadly,
the class of approaches.
4. APPLICATION-SPECIFIC INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
Although many participatory sensing applications have been proposed so far [Khan
et al. 2013], the problem of incentivizing users’ participation has been overshadowed
by other design challenges, such as processing sensed data [Lane et al. 2010]. Indeed,
we identified as few as three systems that include an incentivization mechanism as a
first-class element of their design.
One such system is LiveCompare [Deng and Cox 2009], which is designed to improve
interstore grocery price comparisons for shoppers. LiveCompare addresses the chal-
lenge of user incentivization through a simple query protocol that results in a quid pro
quo interaction. When a user at a grocery store wants a price comparison for a product
of interest, he uses the LiveCompare app installed on his mobile phone to identify the
product by snapping a photograph of the product’s price tag; the photo is then pro-
vided to the LiveCompare PSP as a price comparison query. The product of interest is
uniquely identified via a barcode included on the price tag. In exchange for submitting
this price data point, the user receives pricing information for the scanned product
at other nearby grocery stores. The photograph provided by the user is uploaded to a
central repository for satisfying future queries.
Another system which embeds an incentive in the design is CrowdPark [Yan et al.
2011]. This system allows users to “loosely reserve” parking spots in urban areas, and
is based on the interesting idea that an individual who is currently parked can pro-
vide a notification in advance about when she plans to leave. This information may be
sold to a buyer who is willing to pay to reserve the parking spot. This simple proto-
col for drivers to buy and sell information about parking vacancies acts as an incen-
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tive mechanism for both buyers and sellers of parking information. The authors point
out two interesting concepts when designing the CrowdPark incentive. In particular,
they remark that the incentive mechanism should take into account the “utility” of a
transaction - that is, bonuses should be provided when a transaction leads to success-
ful acquisition of a parking spot, and refunds should be provided when unsuccessful.
However, on the other hand, there is also need to handle malicious users, whose goal is
solely to maximize their monetary gain, either by masquerading as fake sellers or by
denying successful reservations to obtain a refund. To this end, the authors proposed
a simple game-theoretical design of the parking reservation rules which ensures that
buyers maximize their gain by telling the truth. The key idea behind the approach is
that a buyer who successfully parks at a reserved spot can re-sell that spot through
CrowdPark if they tell the truth. If they deny a successful instance of parking in a
reserved spot, obviously they cannot re-sell this spot. Therefore, if reward parameters
are set to ensure that the average gain of re-selling is higher than the gain by lying
and receiving a refund, a rational user will be inclined towards telling the truth. The
extended problem formulation was extended by the same authors in [Hoh et al. 2012],
and analyzed by using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) [Amazon 2014] as the exper-
imental platform. They recruited 131 participants and designed a web-based survey
that replicates the actual scenario of consumer confirmation. Results indicate that the
proposed methodology drives users towards cooperative behavior.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other participatory sensing application to in-
clude an incentive mechanism as a key part of the system design is Waze [Waze 2014].
In particular, the reward strategy of Waze leverages the concept of “gamification” [De-
terding et al. 2011] to engage users and encourage them to provide more information
without the need for monetary incentives. For example, it allows drivers to “drive over”
icons of cupcakes and other objects to earn points. Waze also uses a point-based system
to rank users based on their level of participation. Specifically, Waze offers points for
traffic or road hazard reports, which can be used to change the user’s avatar, and to
increase their status in the community. Users have their own personal “dashboard”
where their ranking among worldwide users is shown. There is also a leaderboard,
that shows who has accrued the most points over all, or who has driven the most miles
this week, or who has filed the most reports [Furchgott 2010]. The concept of gamifi-
cation as applied to participatory sensing has also been recently explored in [Ueyama
et al. 2014], and will be detailed in Section 5 as a non-game-theoretical mechanism to
incentivize user participation.
4.1. Discussion
The incentivization methods that have been proposed as part of the LiveCompare
[Deng and Cox 2009] and Crowdpark [Yan et al. 2011] systems make strong assump-
tions that, ultimately, limit the applicability of the proposed mechanisms. For exam-
ple, the effectiveness of the approach proposed in LiveCompare has not been validated
through a systematic user study or mathematical analysis. In particular, since the
study of the LiveCompare relied on a user survey through AMT rather than a de-
ployment that required users to perform the sensing task [Deng and Cox 2009], it is
unclear if a quid pro quo scheme in which users receive information from the PSP
(e.g., receiving price information at nearby stores for a product of interest) is enough
of an incentive for a user to perform high-burden sensing tasks (e.g., taking photos for
a significant number of items while grocery shopping).
Furthermore, the CrowdPark approach, proposed in [Yan et al. 2011] and extended
in [Hoh et al. 2012], assumes that mobile phones are trustworthy, and therefore a ma-
licious user cannot manipulate location coordinates intentionally when reporting the
location and availability of a parking space. However, it is well-known that users can
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Fig. 4. Functioning scheme of FakeLocator and location-spoofing attack.
easily spoof GPS coordinates by using widely available applications such as FakeLo-
cator, available for both iOS and Android-based smartphones. This piece of software
is able to change the current GPS position of users by hijacking the communication
between the smartphone location interfaces and applications accessing the location
data [Restuccia and Das 2014].For example, FakeLocator acts as an additional loca-
tion provider that takes a higher priority than all others, forcing the Android system
to distribute the fake location that it is advertising. The user can then specify any lo-
cation on Earth to FakeLocator and let the other apps in the smartphone “believe” that
the user is in that location. Hereafter, we refer to this kind of malicious behavior as a
location-spoofing attack. Figure 4 depicts the functioning scheme of FakeLocator and
an example of a location-spoofing attack.
Waze has proven to be effective in incentivizing user participation, as more than 50
millions users participate daily as users of and contributors to the traffic map [Yahoo!
2012]. However, the gamification incentive used by Waze is also prone to the location-
spoofing attack, as the system is not able to recognize between genuine and compro-
mised users. This vulnerability of Waze was also demonstrated by a large-scale attack
in which a fake traffic jam was injected into the system [Atherton 2014]. Therefore,
the game-based incentive system can be compromised by malicious users, who can
continue to earn pointsthrough the gamification incentive without actually perform-
ing any sensing tasksof value.
5. NON GAME-THEORETICAL INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
This section surveys general-purpose incentive mechanisms that do not exploit game-
theoretical concepts in their design. Table I summarizes the papers (in alphabetical
order) discussed in this section, with a brief description of the key contribution. In
order to facilitate the discussion, we further divide the work presented in this section
into three categories:
— Quality of Information (QoI)-aware mechanisms. These mechanisms take into ac-
count the QoI of each sensing report before making decisions on sensing task and
reward assignment. Since QoI in participatory sensing systems has not been clearly
defined yet, the characterization and assessment of QoI differ across the incentive
mechanisms surveyed.
— Resource-aware mechanisms. These mechanisms consider the resource consumption
(e.g., energy, mobile cellular data) of the user in assigning sensing tasks.
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Table I. Summary of non game-theoretical-based incentive mechanisms.
Paper Key contribution QoI Resources Privacy
[Cheung et al. 2014] Resource-aware incentive mechanism × X ×
[Kawajiri et al. 2014] Gamification-based mechanism X × ×
[Li and Cao 2014] Two privacy-preserving incentive mecha-
nisms
× X X
[Li and Cao 2013] Privacy-aware incentive mechanism in-
cluding multiple user contributions
× × X
[Liu et al. 2011] and [Liu
et al. 2014]
QoI-aware and energy-efficient incentive
framework
X X ×
[Luo et al. 2014a] Endorsement-based incentive mechanisms
through web relations
X × ×
[Mukherjee et al. 2014] Incentive mechanism based on types and
priorities of events, quality and timeliness
of reports and user intent
X × ×
[Reddy et al. 2010a] User selection based on spacial and tem-
poral availability as well as participation
habits
X × ×
[Reddy et al. 2010b] Micropayments-based mechanism X × ×
[Ren et al. 2014] Social impact and trustworthiness of users X × ×
[Restuccia and Das 2014] Trust-based framework based on mobile se-
curity agents
X × ×
[Song et al. 2014] QoI-aware incentive mechanism with bud-
get constraints
X × ×
[Tham and Luo 2013] and
[Tham and Luo 2015]
Incentive mechanism with novel definition
of Quality of contributed Service and mar-
ket equilibrium
X × ×
[Ueyama et al. 2014] Gamification-based mechanism × × ×
[Zhang et al. 2014] Recruitment framework with budget con-
straints
X × ×
— Privacy-aware mechanisms. These mechanisms address the need to provide privacy
to the participating users who are exposing sensitive data.
5.1. QoI-aware mechanisms
For participatory sensing applications to be used as effective tools for collecting data
that will be interpreted into high-level information used in decision- making, it is es-
sential to give careful consideration to the quality of information (QoI) that can be de-
rived from participatory sensing data. Methods for assessing the quality of information
(QoI) and encourgaing participants to contribute data that meets QoI requirements for
participatory sensing campaigns continues to emerge as an important research topic.
Several definitions of QoI for participatory sensing have been put forth, including spa-
tial coverage, temporal coverage, and timeliness. QoI metrics for participatory sensing
also focus on the quality of the provider, assessesing the reputation of the participant
for providing useful data as part of the participatory sensing campaign. Below, we dis-
cuss incentive mechanisms that are designed to improve the quality of information
provided by users in participatory sensing systems.
5.1.1. QoI by recruitment, micro-payments and reputation. To improve the QoI achieved
through participatory sensing, Reddy et al. proposed a recruitment process to select
participants that are likely to provide information that meet QoI requirements [Reddy
et al. 2010a]. In this work, QoI is defined in terms of the ability to collect a crowd-
sensed data set that meets spatial and temporal coverage requirements. As such, the
system considers availability predictions of volunteers for recruitment of participants
and their reputations are introduced for incentivization. In detail, the system relies on
three steps to select the users:
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— Qualifier: Participants must meet minimum requirements, such as destinations and
routes within time, space, and transportation mode constraints.
— Assessment: Once participants that meet minimum requirements are found, the re-
cruitment system then identifies which subset of individuals maximize coverage
over a specific area and time period while adhering to the required transportation
modes.
— Progress Review: As a campaign runs, the recruitment system must check partic-
ipants’ coverage and data collection reputation to determine if they are consistent
with their profile.
To build the reputation score of users, the authors use sampling likelihood, as well
as assessments of quality and validity of a user’s contributions over several campaigns
or by campaign-specific calibration exercises. In particular, they use a Beta function-
based algorithm to calculate the reputation, using the the correct and incorrect sensing
reports as α and β parameters, respectively. The authors demonstrate the application
of the framework by analyzing data from a pilot mobility study consisting of ten users.
Similarly, in [Zhang et al. 2014] the authors propose CrowdRecruiter, a framework
that aims to minimize incentive payments by selecting a small number of participants
while satisfying a QoI requirement framed as a probabilistic spatiotemporal coverage
constraint. To reduce the barrier to participation, CrowdRecruiter leverages piggy-
backing on 3G phone calls to send data in an effort to minimize energy consumption
on the users’ mobile devices. Information about the 3G connection is also used to de-
termine how to satisfy the QoI requirement. First, the framework predicts the call and
coverage probability of each mobile user based on historical records. It then efficiently
computes the joint coverage probability of multiple users as a combined set and selects
the near-minimal set of participants, which meets the coverage ratio requirement in
each sensing cycle.
The concept of micro-payments, in which sensing tasks are matched with small pay-
ments, has been also proposed in [Reddy et al. 2010b] as an incentive model to in-
crease high-quality contributions from users. As the first such effort, contributions of
this work include the definition of a set of metrics that can be used to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of an incentive to motivate an individual user. Ths set of metrics included
the quantity of submissions, an application-specific measure of the quality of data sub-
mitted, and the spatial and temporal coverage. An evaluation of the approach was
performed through a pilot study using various micro-payment schemes in a participa-
tory sensing application for a university initiative; users were asked to take photos of
trash bins on campus with the goal of understanding recycling habits across the cam-
pus. Results indicated that micro-payments were effective than a single lump payment
for increasing quantity of submissions, application-specific quality of data (here, clear
and focused images of trash bins located on the campus), and spatiotemporal diversity
of submissions.
Because participatory sensing relies on the contributions of users, researchers have
pointed out the potential for developing systems that identify reliable users [Huang
et al. 2014] as a way to address QoI requirements. Although several reputation frame-
works have been proposed (e.g., [Christin et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2014]), the authors
of [Restuccia and Das 2014] point out that previous incentive and reputation mech-
anisms lack a scalable and secure method for validating the QoI of sensing reports.
For this reason, they propose a novel trust-based data verification system based on
the concept of mobile security agents (MSAs). In detail, MSAs are defined as users
that periodically report information about their surroundings to the PS platform, and
considered to be reliable, which means the information sent by MSAs is correct and
reflects the real condition of the area nearby the MSA.
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Fig. 5. An MSA roaming over the sensing area [Restuccia and Das 2014].
Figure 5 shows a sensing scenario in which only one MSA is roaming the sensing
area. Legitimate and malicious users are depicted by black and red dots, respectively.
Figure 5 also depicts the different locations over time of the MSA at different sensing
rounds. At each sensing round, the MSA reports her sensed data to the PS platform
(PSP). Then, such information is used to update the reputation of the users nearby the
MSA at that particular time. In particular, the reputation is updated only for the users
inside a portion of sensing area, defined as update area and depicted as a blue circle
in Figure 5. The authors argue that this approach provides benefits such as scalability
and security from location-based attacks as the location of users is not involved in
computing their reputation.
5.1.2. QoI by gamification. Exploiting gamification [Deterding et al. 2011] has also been
recently proposed as a viable and effective technique to incentivize users’ participation
and also increase QoI. Briefly, gamification is the use of game thinking and mechanics
in non-game contexts to engage users in solving problems and increase users’ self con-
tributions. Widely known examples of systems that use gamification to encourage par-
ticipation are the crowdsourced programming advice platform Stack Overflow2, which
rewards users who provide top-ranked answers; the job recruitment platform Hacker-
Rank3, which presents users with coding “challenges” that relate to open positions for
which employers are seeking candidates; and the participatory sensing system Waze
[Waze 2014], which uses several gamification elements, including leaderboards, as in-
centives for providing traffic information.
With respect to participatory sensing incentives that use gamification to address QoI
requirements, Kawajiri et al. proposed in [Kawajiri et al. 2014] a framework called
Steered Crowdsensing. The system displays points to users to motivate them to move
to a specific location, which increases QoI as the spacial coverage of the sensing area is
increased. The authors formalize the calculation of points paid to users by introducing
a quality indicator of service in an online machine learning setting. A strong contribu-
tion of the paper is the deployment of a crowdsensing system to test the framework. A
similar approach was also proposed in [Mukherjee et al. 2014], where different incen-
tives were managed based on types and priorities of events, quality and timeliness of
event reports as well as resident intent is used to incentivize users.
2http://www.stackoverflow.com
3http://www.hackerrank.com
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Another approach that uses gamification to address QoI requirements is [Ueyama
et al. 2014], where the authors proposed an incentive mechanism that incorporates
a status level scheme depending on earned reward points, so that users with higher
status can earn more reward points. They also introduced a ranking scheme among
users and a badge scheme so that users are attracted by getting not only monetary
reward points but also by engendering a sense of accomplishment. They then formulate
the problem of sensing given points of interest (PoI) with minimal reward points and
devise a heuristic algorithm for deriving the set of users to which requests are sent and
appropriate reward points for each request. The algorithm requires the participation
probability distribution for each tuple of a user, reward points, and the burden of a
sensing task. Similar to [Kawajiri et al. 2014], they performed an experiment with 18
users for 30 days; results indicate that the mechanism is effective in increasing the
participation of users.
5.1.3. Miscellaneous approaches. One of the first research efforts to include QoI in the
design of the incentive mechanism was [Liu et al. 2011] (extended in [Liu et al. 2014]),
which presented a QoI- and energy-efficient incentive mechanism framework that
maximizes the quality of sensed data with minimization of the incentive cost and en-
ergy consumption of smartphones. This is accomplished by first defining the QoI sat-
isfaction index, which measures how close the received QoI is to the expected/desired
quality. Then, by arguing that the reward must be assigned according to the expecta-
tion of users, they introduce in an analogous manner the credit satisfaction index,
which measures the degree of credit satisfaction for individual smartphone users.
These quantities are used as input to a mathematical model based on a Gur Game
[Tung and Kleinrock 1993], where reward and energy loss guide the users’ choice be-
tween QoI and energy-efficiency.
The game proposed is represented by a nearest-neighbor discrete-time Markov chain
(DTMC) of size 2M , where the set of states are divided in “positive” (from 1 to M ) and
“negative” states (from −M to -1). Depending on the credit and QoI satisfaction indices
at time step j, the state of the DTMC is shifted towards the rightmost positive state M ,
which represents the maximum possible level of contribution, or towards the leftmost
state −M . If the current state at time step j is positive (i.e., j is between 1 and M ),
then the user chooses to participate, otherwise he does not. In such a way, the user
autonomously chooses to participate or not depending on the desired tradeoff between
personal satisfaction and energy consumption.
Recently, Tham et al. also explored the problem of incentivization with QoI in [Tham
and Luo 2013] and [Tham and Luo 2015]. They first propose a new metric called Qual-
ity of Contributed Service (QCS) which characterizes the information quality and time-
liness of a specific real-time sensed quantity achieved. The QCS is a cumulative time-
decaying or timeliness-weighted quality of contribution: the more contributions, the
higher the quality of the contributions, or the more up-to-date the contributions are
in the consumable window, the higher the QCS value will be. Tham et al. also for-
mulate a market-based framework with plausible models of the market participants
comprising data contributors, service consumers, and a service provider. They analyze
the market equilibrium under different conditions and obtain a closed form expression
for the resulting QCS at market equilibrium. Some interesting theoretical findings are
also shown, such as, optimal contribution level and rate for maximizing participant’s
payoff. An algorithm is also proposed to achieve market equilibrium.
Another interesting QoI-aware mechanism was recently proposed in [Song et al.
2014]. In this paper, the target is to find a subset of participants whose sensor data
collection can best satisfy QoI requirements of multiple concurrent tasks in both tem-
poral and spatial dimensions, by supposing a constrained budget for user reward. In
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particular, by defining as ui(X ) the QoI satisfaction index (definition similar to [Liu
et al. 2011]) obtained for the task i ∈ Q by a subset X of the setM of users, and by dm
the reward demanded by user m, the problem is defined as follows:
Maximize: u(X ) = {u1(X ), u2(X ), . . . , uQ(X )}
subject to: X ⊆M and ∑m∈M dm ≤ Ctot (1)
The authors argue that the optimization problem described in Equation 1 is multi-
objective and therefore the optimal solution may not exist. Therefore, they propose a
Pareto-optimal4 version of the problem which is a modified non-linear Knapsack prob-
lem, known to be NP-complete. To solve the problem, the authors propose a dynamic
participant selection strategy called DPS, where participants are selected based on a
greedy algorithm that explicitly considers their expected amount of data collected, re-
quired QoI of multiple tasks, and users’ incentive requirements, under the constraint
of the aggregated task budget defined in Equation 1. To estimate the amount of data
collected from each user, the authors introduce a Markov-based probability model
based on the historical trajectory information of a user and the initial position. This
information, joint with the sensing capabilities of the users, is used to predict the ex-
pected amount of data by all participants. The performance evaluation, conducted on
real mobility traces, includes a comparison between DPS, a random selection algorithm
and [Lee and Hoh 2010b]. Results indicate that DPS achieves better performance than
both approaches.
5.2. Resource-aware mechanisms
A potential barrier to user contributions in participatory sensing campaigns is the con-
sumption of resources associated with performing sensing tasks and providing sens-
ing reports. Research in participatory sensing is beginning to address the need for
resource-aware incentive mechanisms. The work in [Cheung et al. 2014] studies the
decision process of the PSP and the users in participatory sensing applications that
involve photo or video transmissions, where the reporting cost through the cellular
network is non-negligible. This work differentiates from previous work in the fact that
the proposed system model assumes Markovian5 user mobility and WiFi availability
only at predefined locations (i.e., connectivity is contrained). Data collection and user
incentivization are modeled as a two-stage decision process, involving both the PSP
and the users. In the first stage, the PSP announces the reward to the potential partic-
ipants. Specifically, the authors propose a deadline-discounted reward scheme, where
any participant who obtains measurement at its initial location li(1) at time t = 1
and reports its data to the PSP at time t will be given a reward r = θt−1 · R, where
R ≥ 0 is the initial reward and 0 < θ ≤ 1 is a discount factor. The PSP does not grant
any reward for data reported after deadline T . In the second stage, each user makes
its participation and reporting decisions to maximize its expected payoff, by consider-
ing its sensing cost, transmission cost, and the reward scheme of the SP. To this end,
they propose an optimal participation and reporting decision (OPRD) algorithm, which
achieves the maximal user payoff.
4A solution is Pareto-optimal if it is not possible to move from that solution and improve at least one objective
function, without detriment to any other objective function.
5When the mobility is Markovian, time is divided into a set of time slots T , while space is divided in a
set of location L. The current location li(t) ∈ L of user i at time t can be calculated by using the location
transition matrix of user i, defined as Pi , [pi(l′|l)]L×L, where pi(l′|l) is the probability that user i will
move to location l′ in the next time slot given that she is currently at location l.
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5.3. Privacy-aware mechanisms
Privacy is a key concern that can potentially limit the widespread adoption of partici-
patory sensing. The work by Li and Cao was the first approach to simultaneously deal
with incentivization of users with privacy [Li and Cao 2013]. In this paper, they pro-
posed two privacy-aware incentive schemes for participatory sensing to promote user
participation. These schemes allow each mobile user to earn credits by contributing
data without leaking which data she has contributed, and at the same time ensure
that dishonest users cannot abuse the system to earn unlimited amount of credits.
To achieve such goals, the basic idea was to issue one request token for each task to
each user. The user consumes the token when she accepts the task. Since she does not
have more tokens for the task, it cannot accept the task again. Similarly, to satisfy
the second condition, each user will be given one report token for each task. When the
PSP receives a report, it issues pseudo-credits to the reporting user, which can then be
transformed into actual credits later on. To achieve the privacy goals, all tokens are
constructed in a privacy-preserving way, such that a request (report) token cannot be
linked to a user and credit tokens cannot be linked to the task and report from which
the token was earned. The first scheme considers scenarios where a trusted third party
(TTP) is available. It relies on the TTP to protect user privacy, and thus has very low
computation and storage cost at each mobile user. The second scheme removes the as-
sumption of TTP and applies blind signature and commitment techniques to protect
user privacy. The ideas were extended by the same authors in [Li and Cao 2014], where
the problem is extended to the more general case in which sensing tasks may require
multiple reports from each user (e.g., in environmental monitoring applications).
5.4. Discussions
Although the problem of simultaneously incentivizing users and guaranteeing QoI has
been recently tackled by a significant amount of research, the majority of existing
approaches fail to consider the impact of users that voluntarily submit low-quality
information. In particular, only [Restuccia and Das 2014] considers and tackles the
location-spoofing attack described in Section 4.1. Furthermore, some assumptions in
existing work oversimplify the actual complexity of estimating and enforcing informa-
tion quality of sensing reports in participatory sensing systems. For example, in [Liu
et al. 2011] and [Liu et al. 2014] the authors characterize the QoI as “the amount of
information contributed by user i corresponding to the l-th QoI attribute”, which does
not include any information directly related to quality, such as accuracy, timeliness of
report, etc. Also, the proposed strategy based on Gur Game assumes that the user will
always be rational and there will be no interaction of the user with the system, which
is not entirely true in most of the existing participatory sensing applications. Similarly,
in [Tham and Luo 2013] and [Tham and Luo 2015] the authors define QoI as “the de-
tection accuracy of the system whose information quality is reflected in the degree of
confidence that an event of interest has occurred” (i.e., yes/no decision). Although this
assumption makes the analysis more tractable, it restricts the scope of the incentive
framework only to applications handling binary opinions. The same problem is present
in [Reddy et al. 2010a], where the very simple approach based on Beta function is un-
able to capture the complexity of sensing reports. The aspect of understanding and
characterizing QoI is also ignored in [Restuccia and Das 2014], as the authors assume
that an MSA can always postulate a binary decision (i.e., yes or no) regarding the QoI
of a report. Finally, the system proposed in [Zhang et al. 2014] relies on piggybacking
crowdsensing, therefore it is hardly applicable in reality as it assumes that 3G cellu-
lar data submitted by participants during phone calls is available to the participatory
sensing application.
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On the other hand, proposed gamification- and micropayments-based incentive
mechanisms still lack systems to predict the quality of information that will be col-
lected by users, and are based on heuristics rather than on strong mathematical princi-
ples. Also, strong assumptions on how QoI is determined undermine the applicability of
the proposed mechanisms. For example, in [Kawajiri et al. 2014] the authors consider
settings where sensory data can be continuously collected and analyzed, and sensory
data arrives at regular time intervals, which is unrealistic in participatory sensing en-
vironments. As far as resource-aware systems are concerned, [Cheung et al. 2014] only
considers transmission cost and network availability as resource parameters, and fails
to consider the aspect of energy consumption in the analysis. Privacy-aware incentives
proposed in [Li and Cao 2013] and [Li and Cao 2014], although technically sound, do
not consider the aspect of QoI and resource-awareness in their design, therefore their
applicability to real-world campaigns is limited. However, the most serious limitation
of existing work on resource-aware and privacy-aware incentives is the lack of vali-
dation of the systems through actual participatory sensing campaigns. In particular,
experimenting with real participants could allow us to understand the real value of
privacy and resource consumption for participants, and therefore design more efficient
and cost-effective mechanisms.
6. GAME-THEORETICAL INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
This section presents incentive mechanisms that include game-theoretical aspects in
their design. We will discuss first auction-based approaches, and then we will focus
on approaches that are based on other game theoretical foundations. For each of these
categories, it is necessary to discuss first some preliminary concepts before analyzing
approaches that exploit those foundations to incentive contributions to participatory
sensing campaigns.
6.1. Preliminaries on Auction Theory
Auction theory is a branch of game theory that studies how the properties of auctions
and how people act in auction markets. Auctions are decentralized market mecha-
nisms for allocating resources [Krishna 2009], and are particularly interesting because
they may be used to sell any item (i.e., auctions are universal), and the outcome of the
auction does not depend on the identity of the bidders (which means, auctions are
anonymous). Auctions have extensively been used in participatory sensing, and have
been effective in modeling the economic interactions between the PSP and the users.
There are two types of auctions, namely regular and reverse auctions. Figure 6.a and
6.b depict the functioning scheme of a regular and reverse auction. In regular auc-
tions, a seller wants to sell an item, while a group of people, called buyers (or bidders),
compete to buy such item by offering a bid. The seller then selects the highest bidder
and assigns the item to him/her. Conversely, in reverse auctions a single buyer offers
a reward to execute a task (which might be a sensing task in case of participatory
sensing). Multiple sellers are then able to offer bids to execute the task. As the auc-
tion progresses, the price decreases as sellers compete to offer lower bids than their
competitors while still meeting all of the specifications of the task. The task is then
assigned to the lowest bidder(s).
Auction mechanisms are often modeled mathematically. More specifically, an
auction-based mechanism computes (i) an output o = f(b1, b2, . . . , bn), representing the
outcome of the auction (who is the winner) and (ii) a payment vector pi = (p1, p2, . . . pn),
where p = g(b1, b2, . . . , bn) is the money given to the i buyer (eventually, zero to every
buyer except the winner).
Based on the number of objects auctioned on the market, auctions can be catego-
rized into single-object and multi-object auctions. Among single-object auction schemes,
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Fig. 6. Regular vs. Reverse auction.
which are commonly applied in participatory sensing systems, the most important are
first-price and second-price. In first-price auctions, the auctioneer grants the item to
the highest bidder and charges the highest bid. In second-price auctions, the auction-
eer grants the item to the highest bidder, but charges the second highest bid. Another
type of auction is all-pay auction, in which every bidder pays the proposed bid regard-
less of whether they win the prize, which is awarded to the highest bidder as in a
conventional auction.
Four characteristics should be achieved when designing an auction-based incentive
mechanism:
— Individual Rationality. Each user (or bidder) can expect a non-negative profit.
— Truthfulness. Revealing true private valuation is the dominant strategy for each
bidder. In other words, no bidder can improve its utility by submitting a bid different
from its true valuation, no matter how others submit.
— System Efficiency. An auction is system-efficient if the sum of valuations of all the
winning bids is maximized over the possible sets of valuations.
— Computation Efficiency. The outcome of the auction, which means, the set of
winners among all bidders, can be computed in polynomial time.
Truthfulness of a mechanism can be guaranteed by using the following theorem.
THEOREM 1. [Singer 2010] An auction mechanism is truthful if and only if:
— The selection rule is monotone: if user i wins the auction by bidding bi, it also wins
by bidding b′i ≤ bi;
— Each winner is paid the critical value, which means, user i would not win the auction
if it bids higher than this value.
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Furthermore, one of the ways to ensure truthfulness is to use the second-price
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction (VCG) mechanism [Vickrey 1961]. In a forward auc-
tion, the VCG mechanism charges each individual the harm it causes to other bidders
in terms of the social welfare utility, while in a reverse auction, it pays each user an
amount equal to the value contributed by the user to the auction. However, it can
be shown that finding the winning set of users in a VCG mechanism is NP-complete.
Also, VCG auction is vulnerable to bidder collusion. In particular, if all bidders in a
VCG auction reveal their valuations to each other, they can lower some or all of their
valuations, while preserving who wins the auction.
6.2. Auction-based incentive mechanisms
Much research has been devoted to designing auction-based incentive mechanisms for
participatory sensing. Table II summarizes the relevant related work on the topic in
alphabetic order of the authors, with a summary of the main contribution. For each
paper, the set of desirable properties achieved by the proposed auction mechanism is
also reported.
Table II. Summary of auction-based incentive mechanisms. Legend: IR: Individual Rationality, T: Truth-
fulness, SE: System Efficiency, CE: Computation Efficiency.
Paper Summary of contributions IR T SE CE
[Feng et al. 2014a] Location-aware incentive mecha-
nism
X X × X
[Feng et al. 2014b] Incentive mechanisms with dy-
namic sensing task arrival
X X × X
[Gao et al. 2015] Incentive mechanisms in offline
and online bidding settings
X X × ×
[Han et al. 2013] Incentive mechanisms in offline
and online bidding settings
X X × X
[Jaimes et al. 2012] Greedy Incentive Algorithm
(GIA) based on RAPD
X × X X
[Koutsopoulos 2013] Optimal auction-based mecha-
nism including QoS and QoI
X X × ×
[Lee and Hoh 2010b], [Lee
and Hoh 2010a]
Reverse auction-based Dynamic
Price (RAPD) mechanism
X × X X
[Luo et al. 2014c] All-pay auction with risk-averse
users and strictly individual-
rational
X X X X
[Yang et al. 2012] MSensing reverse auction-based
mechanism
X X × X
[Zhao et al. 2014], [Zhao
et al. 2015]
Two online budget-feasible auc-
tion mechanisms
X X × X
The earliest work in this category is [Lee and Hoh 2010b], which was later extended
in [Lee and Hoh 2010a]. This paper presents the design and evaluation of a simple
incentive mechanism called Reverse Auction-based Dynamic Price (RADP). In such
auction, user ui tries to sell his sensing data to a service provider by sending his
claimed bid prices bi. The m users having lowest bid price win the auction and are
subsequently rewarded with a payoff proportionate to their claimed bid price. In order
to prevent users that are not rewarded from dropping out of the participatory sensing
application, the authors also propose a scheme using the concept of virtual credit as a
reward for user participation itself. In detail, a user ui who lost in the previous auc-
tion round r− 1 receives virtual participation credit v in current auction round r. Such
credit can only be used for decreasing bid price, thus increasing winning probability of
user for current auction round. Another important element of RADP is the Return on
Investment (ROI) indicator Si, which is used as a criterion to determine when a user
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is dropping out of the system. ROI index is a function of earned reward over time and
the user cost of service. Users evaluate the Si value every round; if it is below a cer-
tain threshold, then they drop out of the system. In addition, RADP includes a rejoin
mechanism, which allows the auctioneer to communicate the maximum winning price
φk to the users that churned from the system.
Jaimes et al. pointed out in [Jaimes et al. 2012] that [Lee and Hoh 2010b] could
be improved by considering the location of the users, area coverage, and budget con-
straints in the proposed auction-based mechanism. Therefore, they propose a novel
mechanism called Greedy Incentive Algorithm (GIA), which is based on the RAPD
mechanism discussed above and the Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage (GBMC)
algorithm included in [Khuller et al. 1999]. In detail, GBMC addresses the coverage
problem with budget constraints (which is shown to be NP-Hard) by greedily finding a
set of users that covers the greatest possible area within a budget constraint.
The problem of guaranteeing a truthful incentive mechanism was explored for the
first time in the seminal work [Yang et al. 2012]. In this paper, the authors propose
a user-centric model for participatory sensing in which the PSP announces a set of
tasks Γ = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τn} . Each task τj has a value νj > 0 to the PSP. Each user i
selects a subset of tasks Γi ⊆ Γ according to its preference. Furthermore, based on the
selected task set, user i also has an associated cost ci, which in contrast from [Lee and
Hoh 2010b], [Jaimes et al. 2012] is private and only known to the user. User i then
submits the task-bid pair (Γi, bi) to the platform, where bi is bidding price of user i.
Upon receiving the task-bid pairs from all the users, the PSP selects a subset S of
users as winners and determines the payment pi for each winning user i. The utility
of user i is pi − ci, while the utility of the PSP is defined as
u0 = v(S)−
∑
i∈S pi, where
v(S) = ∑τj∈⋃i∈S Γi νj (2)
which is, the sum of value of the tasks executed by the selected users minus the price
paid to the users for execution of the sensing tasks. The proposed auction mechanism,
called MSensing, selects winners and determines payments by following a greedy ap-
proach, therefore it is computation-efficient. This, however, makes the auction not
system-efficient because the user selection and payment is not optimal. The auction
is shown to be truthful by using Theorem 1, as well as individual-rational. Therefore,
4 out of 5 properties are guaranteed by MSensing.
In [Koutsopoulos 2013], Koutsopoulos tackles the problem of truthful incentive
mechanism and proposes a mechanism based on an optimal reverse auction [Myerson
1981], in which the PSP needs to fulfill a given quality of service (QoS) constraint by
“buying” different participation levels from different users. The novelty with respect to
[Yang et al. 2012] lies in the consideration of QoS constraints, as well as the aspect of
quality of information (QoI) of sensing reports in the winner determination phase. In
detail, the QoI of sensing reports is modeled by an empirical quality indicator qi con-
tinuously updated by the PSP, which essentially measures the relevance or usefulness
of information provided by user i in the past. The author claims that this can be quan-
tified by the average deviation of submitted samples from the result of the aggregation
of all user samples. On the other hand, QoS is captured by a generic, positive-valued
function g(x) of participation level vector x = (x1 · · ·xn), which includes as parameters
the vector of qualities of submitted data by users, q = (q1, · · · qn). For example, in ap-
plications that consider monitoring of a quantity of interest, like air pollution or road
traffic condition, g(·) may denote the accuracy of estimation. The target of the mecha-
nism M(c) = {x(c), p(c)} is then to compute a winner vector x(c) and a payment level
vector p(c) which are function of the cost vector c, such that its expected expenditure
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Fig. 7. Offline vs. online auction setting in [Han et al. 2013].
for reimbursing users is minimized. A mechanism is then proposed that guarantees
truthfulness and individual-rationality.
[Luo et al. 2014c] tackles for the first time the problem of providing a truthful mech-
anism which is also system-efficient. In particular, previous work had dealt with NP-
hard scheduling problems which do not allow optimum revenue for the PSP. In this
paper, the authors set the prize as a function of the winners’ contribution in order to
induce the maximum profit, which is defined as the total contribution acquired from all
the users less the contribution-dependent prize. In addition, they assume users may
be risk-averse, which means that users may be reluctant to accept a bargain with an
uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower,
expected payoff. They then design an all-pay auction mechanism which maximizes
the revenue of the PSP and is strictly individual-rationality for both risk-neutral and
weakly risk-averse agents. That is, such agents can expect payoff strictly greater than
zero and therefore are more incentivized to participate.
In [Han et al. 2013], Han et al. studied for the first time the problem of designing
truthful incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing in an online bidding setting.
In particular, in an offline setting, the PSP collects all the users’ bids before deciding
the winners and scheduling the sensing tasks. Conversely, in an online setting, the
users’ bids are revealed one by one, and the PSP must make an irrevocable decision on
assigning sensing tasks right at the moment when the user’s bid is revealed (see Figure
7). Note that this setting is also applicable to a scenario where users arrive at the
sensing area at different moments in time. The authors first define the optimum task
scheduling problem, which includes for the first time the possible sensing start time si
and end ei for each user. After showing the NP-hardness of the problem, they propose
two polynomial-time approximation algorithms that approximate the optimum by a
value O(1). Finally, two incentive mechanisms are proposed for the online and offline
settings, which are shown to be truthful, individual-rational, and computation-efficient
as they both run in O(n2).
In [Zhao et al. 2014] (extended in [Zhao et al. 2015]), the problem of user incen-
tivization in an online auction setting is further explored. In particular, the problem
here is to select a subset of users before a specified deadline, so that the value of
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services provided by selected users is maximized under the condition that the total
payment to these users does not exceed a budget constraint. To this end, the authors
propose two online incentive mechanisms, called OMZ and OMG, which guarantee the
desired properties of auctions and achieve a competitive ratio6 of O(1) with respect to
the offline case. In [Feng et al. 2014b], the authors also study the problem of online
sensing task scheduling as in [Han et al. 2013] and [Zhao et al. 2014], by also consid-
ering dynamic arrival of sensing tasks. In particular, they propose two truthful auc-
tion mechanisms which take both dynamic smartphones and random arrivals of tasks
into consideration. For the offline case, they design an efficient truthful mechanism
with an optimal task allocation algorithm of polynomial-time computation complexity
O(n+γ)3, where n is the number of smartphones and γ is the number of sensing tasks.
For the online case, the authors design a near-optimal truthful mechanism with an
online task allocation algorithm that achieves a constant competitive ratio of θ(1/2). It
is also demonstrated that the proposed auction mechanisms achieve truthfulness, in-
dividual rationality, and computational efficiency. The same authors proposed in [Feng
et al. 2014a] another incentive mechanism which takes into account the location of the
smartphone users. Specifically, the tasks here are location-based, and users can bid
only on tasks which are in the sensing coverage of the smartphone. After proving that
optimally determining the winning bids with location awareness is NP-hard, the au-
thors proposed mechanism consists of a polynomial time and near-optimal task alloca-
tion algorithm, as well as a payment scheme that guarantees truthfulness. Differently
from [Feng et al. 2014b], here the sensing tasks and users’ positions are assumed to be
known in advance and static.
To the best of our knowledge, the most recent contribution is [Gao et al. 2015]. In this
paper, the authors consider the sensor selection problem in a general time-dependent
and location-aware participatory sensing system, taking the long-term user partici-
pation incentive into explicit consideration as in [Lee and Hoh 2010b]. To this end,
they propose a VCG auction policy for the on-line sensor selection, which achieves a
constant competitive ratio of O(1) with the optimal offline solution.
6.2.1. Discussion. Despite the merit of being the first auction-based mechanisms pro-
posed for participatory sensing systems, [Lee and Hoh 2010b] and [Jaimes et al. 2012]
do not guarantee all four properties of auctions. In particular, these approaches do not
consider that cost information is private, and that users may misrepresent their real
costs in order to maximize their own payoffs. As a result, the schemes are not truth-
ful. Given GIA and RAPD algorithms determine the winners of the auction in poly-
nomial time and guarantee non-negative utility, the mechanisms are system-efficient
and individual-rational. Differently from [Lee and Hoh 2010b], [Jaimes et al. 2012]
does not select the users in an optimum way due to the hardness of the coverage prob-
lem, and therefore it is not system-efficient.
Although the work in [Koutsopoulos 2013] provides the only attempt to formalize
information quality as part of the incentive mechanisms, the formulation of QoS and
QoI does not take into account the actual complexity of determining the quality of
each sensing report. Indeed, no algorithm is proposed to accomplish such a goal. The
authors also fail to calculate the complexity of the optimization problem defined in the
paper, nor are algorithms formalized to solve the optimization. Therefore, the system
and computation efficiency of the mechanism are not guaranteed. Furthermore, the
main weakness of [Yang et al. 2012], [Feng et al. 2014a] and [Gao et al. 2015] lies in the
6A mechanism is O(g(n))-competitive if the ratio between the online solution and the optimal solution is
O(g(n)).
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assumption of static tasks and users. While the mathematical analysis in these papers
is sound, such assumption makes the approaches unrealistic for practical applications.
Similarly to non-auction-based mechanisms, the limitations of existing work in de-
signing auction-based mechanism is the assumption of perfect rationality of partici-
pants. Furthermore, a large-scale validation of auction-based mechanisms is still miss-
ing, which is needed to understand whether auction-based mechanisms can work in
real-world implementations.
6.3. Preliminaries on Game Theory
Game theory is “the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between
intelligent rational decision-makers” [Myerson 1991]. Originally developed to model
problems in the field of economics, game theory has recently been applied to a variety
of problems, in most cases, to solve the resource allocation problems in competitive
environments [Hassan et al. 2012], [Birje et al. 2014], including the design of incentive
mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. This is because the entities involved
(i.e., the participating users) are autonomous agents, making decisions only for their
own interests. To this end, game theory provides sufficient theoretical tools to analyze
the users’ behaviors and actions.
6.3.1. General concepts. Game theory models scenarios where individual decision-
makers have to choose specific actions that have mutual or possibly conflicting con-
sequences. A game consists of three major components:
— Players: Players are the entities invoved in the decision making process, and are
denoted by a finite set N = {1, 2, ..., n}.
— Strategies: Each player can choose a strategy si in the set Si of possible strategies.
A strategy profile s is a vector containing all the strategies, i.e., s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn).
Obviously, we have s ∈ S = ⊗i∈NSi, where ⊗ is the Cartesian product.
— Utility or Payoff: The utility ui : S → R of player i is a measurement function on the
possible outcome determined by the strategies of all players, where R is the set of
real numbers.
Players are usually assumed to be rational and selfish, which means each player is
only interested in maximizing its own utility without respecting others’ and the sys-
tem’s performance [Tadelis 2013]. Let s−i denote any strategy profile excluding si, and
s = (si, s−i) for simplicity. We say that player i prefers si to s′i if ui(si, s−i) > ui(s′i, si).
When other players’ strategies are fixed, player i can select a strategy, denoted by
bi(s−i), which maximizes its utility function. Such a strategy is called a best response
of player i. A strategy of player i is dominant if, regardless of what other players do,
the strategy earns player i a larger utility than any other strategy. In order to study
the interactions among players, the concept of Nash Equilibrium (NE) is introduced.
A strategy profile constitutes an NE if none of the players can improve its utility by
unilaterally deviating from its current strategy.
DEFINITION 1. A strategy profile s∗ is a Nash Equibilibrium (NE) if
ui(s
∗) ≥ ui(s∗−i, s′i) ∀i,∀s′i ∈ Si
Games can be classified into two categories, strategic or extensive form game. The
strategic form game is played only once. In this game, the players make their decisions
simultaneously without knowing what others will do. On the contrary, the extensive
form game represents the structure of interactions between players and defines possi-
ble orders of moves in different games. The repeated game is a class of the extensive
form game, in which the strategic game is repeated every time. At the beginning of
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Fig. 8. An example of Stackelberg equilibrium.
each stage, players observe the past history of strategies before making decisions. The
number of stages may be finite or infinite. The utility of each player is the accumu-
lated or discounted utility through all the stages. Therefore, players care not only the
current utility but also the future utilities.
6.3.2. Stackelberg games. A Stackelberg game is an extensive form game used to model
the competition between one player, called the leader, and a set of players, called the
followers. In this game, the leader takes action first and then the followers take ac-
tions. The leader knows ex ante that the followers observe its action and take actions
accordingly. The NE in the Stackelberg game is called Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE).
Figure 6.3.2 depicts the payoff matrix of a Stackelberg game between two competing
law firms as example. We assume that Participant A is the leader, and Participant B
is the follower. The actions for both A and B are low price (LP) and high price (HP). If
A plays strategy LP, B would play strategy HP, as it gives player B a utility of 5 (as
opposed to a utility of 2 should B play strategy LP). This leads to a utility of 6 for A. If
A plays strategy HP, B would play strategy LP, as it gives B a utility of 3 (as opposed
to a utility of 2 should B play strategy HP). This leads to a utility of 4 for A. Hence A
would play strategy LP, since doing so would result in a utility of 6 compared to 4 by
playing strategy HP. As explained before, B would play HP if A plays LP. Therefore the
Stackelberg Equilibrium of this game is (LP, HP).
The existence of an SE is important, since an SE strategy profile is stable (no player
has an incentive to make a unilateral change) whereas a non-NE strategy profile is
unstable. Also, the uniqueness of an SE allows the leader to predict the behaviors of
the followers and thus, enables the leader to select the optimal strategy for itself.
6.4. Non-auction-based incentive mechanisms
Very few incentive mechanisms involving non-auction-based game theory have been
proposed. In [Hoh et al. 2012], the authors considered the problem of trustworthy
crowdsourced parking, and presented an incentive platform named TruCentive. The
target of such platform is twofold: (i) provide incentives to stimulate contribution of
high-quality parking information, and (ii) prevent malicious participants from spam-
ming the parking service with high volume of useless data. The first aim is achieved
by a simple yet effective protocol in which contributors and consumers “trade” parking
information. In details,
— A contributor submits a message to TruCentive, receiving in turn a reward of D
units;
— A consumer “buys” a message for available parking spot information, depositing N
units;
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— The consumer drives to the parking spot and sends back an active confirmation of
whether the parking spot information led to a successful parking in a reserved space
or not. If the confirmation is successful, R credits are refunded to the consumer. If
successful, X bonus points are credited to the contributor.
The second target is achieved by introducing a game-theoretical-formulated incen-
tive protocol. The key idea behind the approach is that consumers who successfully
parks at a traded spot can re-sell that spot through TruCentive if they tell the truth.
In particular, if consumers lie about the success status of last parking, they cannot
re-sell this parking spot to the next consumer. Therefore, reward parameters are set to
ensure that the average gain of re-selling is higher than the gain by lying and receiving
a refund. Figure 9 depicts the payoff matrix for consumers as a function of the behav-
ior, honest or dishonest, and last parking status, successful or unsuccessful. In order to
have (Successful, Honest) and (Unsuccessful, Honest) best strategies, D+pX ≥ R ≥ D
must hold, which means, X ≥ 1/p(R − D). This provides a lower bound for the bonus
X. Regarding the upper bound, the authors argue that the payment strategy must be
profitable for the administration of the system, therefore, the choice of X must take
into account total revenue and costs of providing the service.
Duan et al. introduced [Duan et al. 2012] and extended[Duan et al. 2014] and anal-
ysis of different incentive mechanisms to motivate the collaboration of smartphone
users on data acquisition and distributed computing applications. To collect massive
amounts of sensitive data from users, they propose a game-theoretical reward mecha-
nism based on a Stackelberg game, where the PSP can earn a fixed positive revenue
only if enough smartphone users agree to participate. The authors argue that this
model is sound, as an incentive mechanism is effective only when it is possible to build
a large enough database to support the sensing application (e.g. live traffic maps).
Specifically, the game model proposed is a two-stage Stackelberg game under incom-
plete information. In the first stage, the master announces the total reward R to be
allocated among the required minimum number n0 of participating users. In order for
the master to receive revenue V , the number of participating users n must be greater
or equal to n0. In the second stage, each user decides whether to join the collaboration
or not by predicting other users’ costs and decisions, along with expected reward. In-
terestingly enough, the cost Ci for user ui is modeled as a function of both privacy loss
and energy consumption. In the analysis, it turns out that it is better to reward users’
participation efforts irrespective of the result of the collaboration. This encourages
users to collaborate, and hence increases the chance of collaboration success. Then,
the target of the authors is to to characterize the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE)
that specify players’ stable choices in all stages. As expected, the results indicate that
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if the master knows the users’ collaboration costs Ci, then the selection is optimum as
it can involve only users with the lowest costs.
The most important contribution pertaining to this class of incentive mechanisms
was introduced in [Yang et al. 2012]. In this landmark paper, the authors consider
two system models: the platform-centric model where the PSP provides reward shared
by participating users, and the user-centric model where users have more control over
the payment they will receive. For the platform-centric model, Yang et al. design an
incentive mechanism using a Stackelberg game, where the PSP is the leader while the
users are the followers.
It is worthwhile describing this method in detail due to its remarkable theoretical
properties. In such model, there is only one sensing task, and the PSP announces a
total reward R > 0 to incentivize users’ participation to it. The sensing plan of user ui
is denoted by ti, and represents the time units ui is willing to provide to accomplish
the sensing service, whereas ci includes the sensing cost for user ui. By defining as U
the set of all users, the utility ui of the user ui is defined as
ui =
ti∑
j∈U tj
·R− ti · ci (3)
which ultimately is reward minus cost. The utility of the PSP is defined as
u0 = λ log
(
1 +
∑
i∈U
log (1 + ti)
)
−R (4)
where λ > 1 is a system parameter, and the inner and outer log terms quantify, respec-
tively, the value obtained from the sensing time of user i and the overall participating
users. The target of the PSP is to decide the optimal value of R so as to maximize
Equation (4), while each user decides its sensing time ti to maximize Equation (3) for
the given value of R. This problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the PSP
is the leader and the participants are the followers. It is demonstrated that a unique
Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) exists, and it also shown how to compute such SE. This
is an important result since the utility of the PSP is maximized, and none of the users
can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy - hence, the
strategy is stable.
6.4.1. Discussions. The major limitation of the work in this category is the assumption
of perfect rationality of participants and the absence of malicious participants. In other
words, the calculation of the equilibria holds only whether the participants willingly
choose to perform the action that is supposed to be best for them. However, do they
know the action that is best for them? Are they willing to do it, regardless of other fac-
tors that may influence their choice (e.g., time available to perform sensing services)?
How does the system perform when participants willingly become malicious, even it
is not the most rational choice for them? These papers do not answer these questions,
and instead rely on strong assumptions that allow the authors to derive a solid and
comprehensive mathematical analysis that in reality, may no longer hold.
Regarding technical limitations, the performance of the TruCentive solution [Hoh
et al. 2012], is dependent on a good choice of the parameter X, which represents the
bonus points that are credited for a successful and honest contribution. However, the
authors did not propose any methodology to estimate or set X as function of other
system parameters, which limits the system’s applicability in real-world applications.
The two-stage Stackelburg game approach introduced in [Duan et al. 2012] assumes
that the optimum strategy is found by knowing the collaboration costs of all users,
which is unrealistic in practical scenarios as users may (perhaps maliciously) provide
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:26 F. Restuccia et al.
Research challenges
Understanding
motivations
of participants
- Tailoring incentives
to applications
- Tailoring incentives to users
Behavior-conscious
incentive mechanisms
- Modeling bounded rationality
of participants
- Modeling gamification-based
approaches
Effective QoI-aware
incentive mechanisms
- Defining QoI
- Characterizing QoI
- Enforcing QoI
Fig. 10. Summary of proposed research challenges.
incorrect information about their costs. An even stronger assumption is applied in the
platform-centric Stackelburg game introduced in [Yang et al. 2012], which assumes
that costs and sensing times are perfectly known by the PSP.
7. OPEN RESEARCH CHALLENGES
The last years have seen the emergence of research devoted to designing incentiviza-
tion mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. While a significant number of solu-
tions applicable to multiple contexts have been proposed, there are still some research
challenges to be tackled to allow the widespread use of effective incentive mechanisms
in participatory sensing. Figure 10 summarizes the proposed research agenda to im-
prove and transforming existing incentive mechanisms.
7.1. What is the best way to incentivize users?
Before developing an incentive mechanism, a fundamental question must be answered:
what incentive works best to motivate volunteers to contribute to a participatory sens-
ing campaign?
Understanding the motivations that drive human beings to perform actions or tasks
has been the object of abundant research, especially in the psychology domain [Elliot
and Covington 2001], [Maehr and Meyer 1997], [Maslow 1943]. In this context, the
term motivation has been defined as the scientific term for the representation of the
reasons for our actions, our desires, and our needs [Pardee 1990]. Motivation can be
divided into two different categories, known as intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
— Intrinsic motivation can be defined as the self-desire to seek out new things and
new challenges, to analyze one’s capacity, to observe and to gain knowledge [Ryan
and Deci 2000b]. It is driven by an interest or enjoyment in the task itself, and
exists within the individual rather than relying on external pressures or a desire
for reward. Intrinsic motivation is a natural motivational tendency and is a critical
element in cognitive, social, and physical development. For example, students have
an intrinsic motivation when they believe they have the skills to be effective in
reaching their desired goals [Ryan and Deci 2000a].
— Extrinsic motivation refers to the performance of an activity in order to attain a de-
sired outcome and it is the opposite of intrinsic motivation [Ryan and Deci 2000b].
It comes from influences outside of the individual, and is usually used to attain
outcomes that a person would not get from intrinsic motivation. Common extrin-
sic motivations are rewards (for example money) for showing the desired behavior,
and/or the threat of punishment following misbehavior. Competition is also an ex-
trinsic motivator because it encourages the performer to win and to beat others, not
simply to enjoy the intrinsic rewards of the activity [Ryan and Deci 2000a].
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges A:27
In motivation theory, an incentive is defined as something that motivates an indi-
vidual to perform an action. The study of incentive structures is central to the study
of all economic activities, both in terms of individual decision-making and in terms of
co-operation and competition within a larger institutional structure [Armstrong and
Stephens 2005]. Incentives can be classified as either positive or negative. Positive in-
centives seek to motivate others by promising a reward, whereas negative incentives
aim to motivate others by threatening a punishment. Incentives can be to classified
according to the different ways in which they motivate agents to take a particular
course of action. One common taxonomy [Dalkir 2013] divides incentives into four
broad classes.
— Remunerative. They take place when an agent can expect some form of material
reward (e.g., money) in exchange for acting in a particular way.
— Moral. They are said to exist where a particular choice is widely regarded as “the
right thing to do”, or as particularly admirable, or where the failure to act in a
certain way is condemned as indecent. A person acting on a moral incentive can
expect a sense of self-esteem, and approval or even admiration from his community.
— Natural. Similarly to intrinsic motivations, natural incentive may be curiosity, men-
tal or physical exercise, admiration, fear, anger, pain, joy, or the pursuit of truth, or
the control over things in the world or people or oneself.
— Coercive. A person can expect a coercive incentive when the failure to act in a par-
ticular way will result in punishment being used against her by others in the com-
munity, for example, by inflicting pain in punishment, or by imprisonment, or by
confiscating or destroying their possessions.
In the context of participatory sensing, it is still unknown what would be the best
way to incentivize users. More specifically, although recent research has tried to under-
stand the relation between demographics and user participation [Christin et al. 2013;
Omokaro and Payton 2014], there is currently a lack of a general, empirical study
on the motivations of volunteers to perform participatory sensing tasks and the effec-
tiveness of participatory sensing incentives across different contexts. Furthermore, to
date, incentives for participatory sensing have largely been applied in an ad hoc, “one
size fits all” manner, assuming that all applications have the same requirements and
people have all the same needs. Additional study is needed to develop a systematic
approach to the design and selection of incentives that are tailored to a particular ap-
plication, and personalized to motivate individual volunteers to perform participatory
sensing tasks.
7.1.1. Tailoring incentives to applications. Recent work on participatory sensing has
posited that the characteristics of applications, particularly with respect to the kinds
of sensing tasks required, can impact the effectiveness of incentives [Rula et al. 2014].
In particular, sensing tasks may be implicit, occurring in the background with little or
no user interaction (e.g., capturing location traces over the course of a predetermined
time period), or may require explicit user intervention (e.g., capturing a report of the
perceived conditions at a local watershed). Some sensing tasks have spatiotemporal
constraints, requiring a volunteer to be at a particular location at a particular time.
Sensing tasks also differ in terms of the cognitive overhead required; some sensing
tasks simply require the capture of a sample from sensors on a mobile device, while
others require volunteers to provide observations, interpretations, or opinions. Exper-
imental research with large-scale deployments of participatory sensing applications
can lead to a better understanding of how incentives can be tailored to the required
sensing task. More broadly, the purpose of the participatory application itself may ap-
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peal to a potential volunteer’s intrinsic motivation and impact participation. Studies in
the related domains of citizen science and crowdsourcing show that intrinsic motiva-
tors often have a greater impact than remunerative rewards on increasing the quality
of task performance [Nov et al. 2011; Rogstadius et al. 2011; Kaufmann et al. 2011]. In
fact, offering an incentive that appeals as an extrinsic motivator may have a negative
impact on an individual’s intrinsic motivation, and can therefore result in reducing
the overall motivation to perform a task [Gneezy and Rustichini 2000]. Understanding
what motivates individuals, by using surveys/interviews, can aid in tailoring partici-
patory sensing incentives that are effective in garnering participation.
7.1.2. Tailoring incentives to users. Research that explores motivation in the context of
volunteerism has shown that several factors influence the motivations of an individual,
including age [Carstensen et al. 1999; Wilson 2000; Okun and Schultz 2003], race [Mu-
sick et al. 2000; Morrow-Howell et al. 1990], class [Musick et al. 2000], religion [Musick
et al. 2000], gender [Eisenberg 1992; Wilson and Musick 1997; Wuthnow 1995; Rad-
dick et al. 2009] and education [Rosenthal et al. 2010]. This suggests that there is an
opportunity for personalized incentives that appeal to the motivations of an individual.
Researchers are beginning to explore this idea within the context of participatory
sensing. Work by Omokaro et al. [Omokaro and Payton 2014] takes a first step toward
exploring how demographics affect the motivations of potential participatory sensing
volunteers. Preliminary results from a survey of over 200 people indicate that indi-
viduals from different age groups respond similarly to incentives intended to appeal
to extrinsic motivations, but displayed significant differences in their response to in-
centives intended to appeal to intrinsic motivations. Another study was conducted in
[Christin et al. 2013], in which the authors analyze the impact of demographics, incen-
tives, and gathering conditions on both the importance and value of privacy by means
of a questionnaire-based user study with 200 anonymous participants.
While these preliminary findings show promise for this direction of research, other
factors that impact an individual’s motivation to contribute to participatory sensing
campaigns remain to be explored. In particular, the sensing process takes time, inter-
rupts other activities, consumes additional battery power and data traffic bandwidth.
How does these issues impact on the users’ willingness to participate? What is the
right amount of incentive, and how much can we ask from a particular user in terms
of privacy loss, time, energy and bandwidth resources? Further quantitative and qual-
itative study, using surveys, interviews, and participatory sensing deployments with
large and diverse user populations is needed to understand the motivations of vol-
unteers and the effectiveness of incentives to appeal to those motivations within the
unique context of participatory sensing. Research efforts should also consider the life-
cycle of motivation; an individual’s motivation to contribute to a participatory sensing
campaign may change over time, as has been found to be the case in citizen science
projects [Rotman et al. 2012].
7.2. Towards behavior-conscious incentive mechanisms
So far, game-theoretical-based incentive mechanisms have always implicitly assumed
the users are perfectly rational, which means, always taking the choice that maximizes
their utility. However, what happens when users behave in a way that is less than ra-
tional? Practical experience suggests that the assumption of perfect rationality hardly
holds in reality, as human beings are driven and influenced by different motivations,
for example, because of emotional or personal constraints [Pita et al. 2010], or simply
because remunerative incentives are not effective. Therefore, even individuals who in-
tend to make rational choices are often bound to make satisfying or necessary (rather
than maximizing or optimizing) choices in complex situations. For these reasons, the
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incentive mechanisms proposed present a significant gap between the theoretical mod-
eling and the actual behavior of users in participatory sensing contexts. To tackle such
challenge, one possible solution may be modeling interactions by using concepts from
behavioral game theory (BGT) [Camerer 2003a]. BGT uses experimental evidence to
inform mathematical models of cognitive limits, learning rules and social utility of
choices [Camerer 2003b]. It has mainly three components: (i) mathematical theories
of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each
other; (ii) a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of reason-
ing people naturally do; and (iii) a theory of how people learn from experience to make
better strategic decisions.
7.2.1. Modeling bounded rationality of participants. Among others, one of the powerful tools
that BGT offers is the concept of bounded rationality [Simon 1957] [Simon 1982]. The
concept stems from the fact that in general, humans make decisions under three un-
avoidable constraints: (i) only limited, often unreliable, information is available re-
garding possible alternatives and their consequences; (ii) human mind has only lim-
ited capacity to evaluate and process the information that is available; and (iii) only a
limited amount of time is available to make a decision. One of the approaches [Rubin-
stein 1998] to model bounded-rationality behaviors is to directly and explicitly involve
procedural aspects of decision making in the model. A procedural aspect is defined in
this context as the rationale that leads the decision maker to a particular behavior,
which might be different from the expected one (i.e., the one that maximizes user’s
utility). Some examples, cast in the context of participatory sensing, are:
— Users may be concerned about the complexity of the strategy they employ. For ex-
ample, choosing the simpler strategy instead of the optimum one might be better for
some users, as demonstrated in [Kahneman and Tversky 1979].
— Users might have limited ability to understand the game, for example, because of in-
complete information at their disposal. The information may also be asymmetrical,
which means, some users know more than others about the game being played.
— Users may be time-constrained and may not be able (or willing) to play the optimum
strategy according to the game being played. For example, if the interaction between
the user and the PSP is repeated, the PSP might play an equilibrium according
to a model based on an extensive-form game. However, the equilibrium played by
the users may be calculated by considering a different time-horizon, and therefore,
mismatch the ones calculated by the PSP.
— In realistic contexts, participating users might not known the details of the game
been played. Therefore, they need to learn over time the strategy that maximizes the
payoff. In such context, users might have different learning strategies. For example,
some might use a reinforcement approach [Barto 1998] (i.e., adapting the strategy as
a function of current and past payoffs), while some might use anticipatory learning
[Camerer et al. 2002] to reason more thoughtfully on what the other players are
doing and the game being played.
Therefore, it becomes necessary to embed these and other procedural aspects while
modeling incentive mechanisms. Then, we need to identify restrictions on the space
of preferences that are compatible with those procedures, and then optimize based on
those restrictions. One way to incorporate procedural aspects, and therefore, uncer-
tainty in the equilibria that will be played by users, is to study the Quantal Response
Equilibria (QRE) of the game, concept first proposed in [McKelvey and Palfrey 1995].
QRE provide a statistical framework to analyze games that incorporate realistic limi-
tations to rational choice modeling of games. In particular, QRE allow every strategy
to be played with non-zero probability, and so any strategy is possible (though not
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necessarily reasonable). By far, the most common specification for QRE is the logit
equilibrium (LQRE) [McKelvey and Palfrey 1995], where player’s strategies are cho-
sen according to the probability distribution
P{ai} =
exp{λ ·∑a−i∈A−i P{a−i} · ui(ai, a−i)}∑
a′i∈Ai exp{λ ·
∑
a−i∈A−i P{ai} · ui(a′i, a−i)}
(5)
The λ parameter is defined as the “rationality” parameter: the choice of action be-
comes purely random as λ → 0, whereas the action with the higher expected payoff is
chosen as λ → ∞. Analogously to Nash equilibria, QRE can be calculated for normal-
form games [McKelvey and Palfrey 1995] and extensive-form games [McKelvey and
Palfrey 1998]. The value of λ is usually chosen according to experimental data; how-
ever, such data does not exist yet to formulate QRE for games in the context of partici-
patory sensing. Additional research is therefore needed to model the λ parameter and
therefore, obtain more realistic equilibria.
7.2.2. Modeling gamification-based approaches. As we have discussed in Section 5, gami-
fication [Deterding et al. 2011] has been proposed as a viable and effective technique
to incentivize users’ participation using a natural (i.e., based on joy or entertainment)
incentive type, instead of a remunerative one. Although some gamification-based in-
centive mechanisms have already been proposed [Kawajiri et al. 2014] [Mukherjee
et al. 2014] [Ueyama et al. 2014], it is still to be demonstrated through large-scale
deployments whether these mechanisms may work effectively in the context of partici-
patory sensing. In particular, on one hand, the leaderboard-based system used by Waze
[Furchgott 2010] has proven to be effective in keeping the users in the sensing loop.
However, on the other hand, recent studies [Hamari et al. 2014] cast doubts on gam-
ification, as the authors argue that gamification effects are greatly dependent on the
context in which gamification is being implemented, as well as on the users using it.
Therefore, additional experimental research is needed to understand and validate the
conditions by which gamification is a good strategy for user incentivization in partici-
patory sensing, and possibly, generalize the concept to a common framework that can
be used by participatory sensing systems. Indeed, by far existing gamification-based
have been essentially based on heuristics, and do not provide a framework to analyze
and model the behavior of users in participatory sensing under gamification-based in-
centive. Although some modeling languages have been proposed [Herzig et al. 2013],
they are general-purpose and lacking the ability to capture the complex interactions in
participatory sensing. Therefore, research effort has to be put forth to identify positive
and negative aspects of the approach as a function of the specific participatory sensing
considered.
7.3. Towards effective QoI-aware incentive mechanisms
One of the greatest limitations of existing incentive mechanisms, and more generally,
of participatory sensing systems, is that they are not effective in tackling the problem
of verifying the actual QoI of sensing reports. In particular, the research efforts to solve
such challenge can be divided in two main categories:
— Reputation-based frameworks. These frameworks use concepts such as informa-
tion provenance (i.e., location of users) [Wang et al. 2011] [Wang et al. 2013] or
consensus-based techniques [Huang et al. 2010] to determine the reliability of
users and therefore filter out unreliable reports from the systems. The main is-
sue of reputation-based systems is that they are prone to collusion-based attacks or
the location-spoofing-based attacks described in Section 4.1. Therefore, such frame-
works cannot be directly used in real-world participatory sensing systems.
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— QoI-aware incentive mechanisms. Some incentive mechanisms, for example, [Kout-
sopoulos 2013] [Liu et al. 2011], reward the participating users based on the per-
ceived QoI of sensing reports. Usually, the QoI of sensing reports is calculated using
heuristic functions [Tham and Luo 2013], and do not measure the actual quality of
the sensing report as compared to the real-world quantity being measured.
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that addresses at once collusion- and
location-based attacks is [Restuccia and Das 2014], by proposing a methodology based
on mobile security agents (see Section 5) that validates and improves the QoI of sens-
ing reports in a realistic, scalable, and secure way. However, one of the limitations of
[Restuccia and Das 2014] is that the authors do not provide a detailed definition of
QoI, nor do they address the problem of how to determine the QoI of sensing reports.
More specifically, they assume that QoI can be computed by using external functions
tailored to such purpose. However, this might not be the case when multimedia data
(e.g., audio/video feed, pictures) is being collected by the participatory sensing system.
In particular, when the data is coming from physical sensors such as temperature,
pressure, or light, the QoI may be defined as the accuracy of that measurement w.r.t.
the real phenomenon being monitored. However, how do we define the QoI of a picture,
of a sound, of a video? In such case, the specific context of the participatory sensing
application may significantly influence the definition of QoI. For example, in case of
noise pollution monitoring [D’Hondt et al. 2013], the maximum noise level in decibels
might be sufficient to characterize QoI. On the other hand, in case of voice recognition
[Lu et al. 2011] and/or applications that count the number of speakers in a room [Xu
et al. 2014], precise audio measurements (in terms of portion of spectrum detected)
could be needed to recognize the person and/or how many people are currently in that
room. Therefore, additional research is necessary to provide different definitions of QoI
that are valid for the spectrum of participatory sensing systems nowadays available.
Furthermore, although the approach based on MSAs [Restuccia and Das 2014] is
very promising, it is still necessary to model, and possibly, optimize the QoI as a func-
tion of the resources (e.g., MSAs) employed. In particular, can we design a mechanism
to know in advance how many resources are needed to guarantee a certain QoI of the
accepted sensing reports? Can we predict the probability of accepting an unreliable
sensing report, and reduce it as a function of the resources employed? Addressing these
issues is extremely challenging, given the hardly predictable behavior or participants.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Smart devices have revolutionized our lives and the way we interact with the sur-
rounding environment. What was technologically a dream 20 years ago has now be-
come reality, and with more and more users embedding pervasive technologies in their
daily lives, an immense number of novel applications that drastically improve people’s
everyday life are now possible. Among all, participatory sensing is certainly one of the
most promising paradigms, as it allows to decrease dramatically infrastructure costs
and obtain detailed information about the phenomenon being monitored.
In this paper, we have characterized the state-of-the-art of incentive mechanisms in
participatory sensing systems, and have proposed a set of open research challenges
related to such topic. First, we provided an overview of participatory sensing and iden-
tified the main components of existing incentive mechanisms. Then, we presented a
taxonomy of such mechanisms, based on their purpose and their methodology, and dis-
cussed important contributions, insights, and limitations of the state of the art within
each category of the taxonomy. Finally, we proposed and discussed a set of research
challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing, which comprise guarantee-
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ing quality of information, modeling the behavior of users, and understanding the best
reward strategy.
Future work will be dedicated to investigate the proposed research challenges. In
particular, we plan to build a large-scale deployment of a participatory sensing system
on our campus, and study the impact of various incentive types, both intrinsic and
extrinsic, on the frequency and quality of sensing reports by participants. We also plan
to design incentive mechanisms which assume bounded user rationality, and test them
on practical testbeds.
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